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█ Abstract Extreme pain and suffering are associated with depression as well as tissue damage. The impos-
sibility of imagining any feelings of pain and suffering intersect with two matters: the kind of imagining 
involved, and the nature of delusions. These two correspond to the sequence of the following discussion, in 
which it is contended first that feelings of pain and suffering resist being imagined in a certain, key way 
(defined here as proprietary imagining P simpliciter), and second that, given a certain analysis of delusional 
thought, this precludes the possibility of delusional affections while allowing delusions about affections 
(here affective delusions).  
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█ Riassunto Dolore immaginato e dolore illusorio – Dolore estremo e sofferenza sono solitamente associati a 
depressione e danni tissutali. L’impossibilità di immaginare il provare dolore e sofferenza dipende da due 
fattori: il tipo di immaginazione coinvolta e la natura dell’illusione. Questi due fattori saranno trattati in 
parallelo nell’analisi che qui si propone, in cui si discuterà in primo luogo come il provare dolore e soffe-
renza oppongano resistenza all’essere immaginati in un certo modo (qui indicato come carattere proprie-
tario dell'immaginare P simpliciter) e in secondo luogo come, secondo una certa analisi del pensiero illuso-
rio, questo preclude la possibilità di affezioni illusorie mentre consente illusioni circa le affezioni (qui indi-
cate come illusioni affettive). 
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OUR MENTAL LIFE COMPRISES MORE than belief 
states narrowly understood. There are also affec-
tions, including states of feeling. And although 
many would reduce affections to their cognitive 
(and representational) components, a robust al-
ternative presents itself in various feeling theories 
of emotion.1 Feelings of pain resulting from tissue 
damage have provoked philosophical attention 
over whether they are intrinsically subjective and 
private, leaving claims about them immune from 
error. This idea is extended here to whether any 
pain experiences, including those associated with 
severe depression, can be merely imaginary, and 
involve misapprehensions that might, on some 
analyses, suggest delusional thinking. 
Extreme pain and suffering are associated with 
depression as well as tissue damage. The impossibil-
ity of imagining any feelings of pain and suffering 
intersect with two matters: the kind of imagining 
involved, and the nature of delusions. These two 
correspond to the sequence of the following discus-
sion, in which it is contended first that feelings of 
pain and suffering resist being imagined in a cer-
tain, key way (defined here as proprietary imagin-
ing P simpliciter), and second that, given a certain 
analysis of delusional thought, this precludes the 
possibility of delusional affections while allowing de-
lusions about affections (here affective delusions).  
That derived from misleading experience felt 
pain might also be delusional (as affective delu-
sions) depends on the nature of delusions and the 
relationship between such feelings and the infer-
ences drawn from them. Whether theorized as 
ideas, beliefs, imaginings or sui generis, delusions 
eventually involve doxastic states, with proposi-
tional content. Parallels with the beliefs inferred 
from misleading hallucinatory experience are thus 
at the center of this inquiry, an immediate spur for 
which was a group of studies contending with the 
idea that pain associated with tissue damage might 
be subject to hallucination, just as other perceptions 
are.2 The same sort of parallel had been drawn long 
ago, in a handful of remarks by Kant about the pain 
and suffering endured by the depressed melanchol-
ic, it is pointed out. Described as «mere delusions 
of misery» which the subject «creates for him-
self», Kant compares them with the imaginary ill-
nesses of the hypochondriac.3 (As recently as 1993, 
moreover, the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and statistical manual included a catego-
ry (Pain disorder associated with psychological factors 
[subtype 307.80]) vulnerable to interpretation 
along the lines of Kant’s position).4  
Aside from the special case of proprietary im-
agining simpliciter, there is much, and perhaps 
much of greater significance, about pain and suf-
fering that permits being misapprehended, and 
mis-imagined. Nonetheless, the analysis undertak-
en here may also have implications. For example, 
few if any doubt that our sincere reports of pain 
from tissue damage provide a trustworthy epis-
temic guide. By pointing to this additional feature 
regarding imaginability common to both kinds of 
feelings, the following discussion should serve to 
dispel a lingering suspicion that the pain of de-
pression or other mood disorders might be, as 
Kant suggests, a mere figment of the sufferer’s im-
agination. 
 
█  1 Delusions, hallucinations, imagining and im-
agination: some preliminaries 
 
Delusional and hallucinatory processes are often 
allied, or even confused. On one model, all halluci-
nation reduces to delusion, since it occurs only 
when mistaken inferences are drawn based on 
flawed perceptual experience, i.e., derived from one 
of the outer senses. Rather than presupposed here, 
the analogy of hallucination with one central form 
of inner experience – pain feelings – is questioned.5 
The placebo produces real effects, by way of 
real, if only incompletely recognized, expectations. 
Similarly, descriptions of psychogenic and phan-
tom limb pain are careful to note that the pain is 
really felt, even if its origins cannot be linked to 
tissue damage.6 The workings of the imagination 
are thus responsible for downstream states that, as 
veridical experiences, are felt. But there may also 
be non-veridical imaginings – (mis)apprehensions 
of the merely imaginary. Explored in what follows 
is whether feelings of pain and suffering can be 
merely imaginary in this way. 
Imagining, in contrast to perceiving, believing 
or remembering some object involves forming a 
particular sort of mental representation or “im-
age” of that object with a range of familiar distin-
guishing features (such as being able to be non-
actual states of affairs).7 The fact that the imagina-
tion can and does affect and effect feeling states 
has been most emphasized in philosophical writ-
ing about responses to works of fiction and dra-
ma.8 Yet much ordinary mental life also involves 
emotionally charged relations to what is merely 
imaginary. We speculate on what might have been 
(with horror, relief) and anticipate future states of 
affairs (with eagerness, dread, or impatience). 
That the imagination produces strong feelings in 
most of us is just as evident as that fictions do, it 
has also been observed: «The power of fictions to 
move us […] is simply a special case of the power 
of the imagination to do so».9 
As Kant’s «mere delusions of misery» indicates, 
identification of delusion as disordered, or “cor-
rupted” imagination has a long lineage.10 More re-
cently, some empirical research has seemed to indi-
cate imaginative limitations in those suffering de-
pression, suggesting deficits in their ability to envi-
sion future possibilities and options.11 Despite pos-
sible defects particular to the depression sufferer’s 
imagination, however, the present inquiry explores 
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the hypothesis that if they cannot be imagined, then 
these feelings cannot be imagined by anyone. 
Some beliefs about states of pain and suffering 
would rank as delusional. The assertion that the 
pain of my headache was brought about by Mar-
tians would likely be an example. So there are af-
fective delusions, broadly understood. But this in-
quiry concerns whether, as well as affective delu-
sions, there are also what can be called delusional 
affections. Section 2 introduces the ways the notion 
of imaginary pain and suffering might be under-
stood. The contrast between (really) felt and 
(merely) imagined is considered in relation to to-
day’s depressive states, that share recognizable 
features with Kant’s melancholic ones, as well as 
pain resulting from tissue damage. Misrepresenta-
tions about felt pain, inviting description as affec-
tive delusions, is placed in contrast with the hypo-
thetical category of delusional affections. In section 
3 Kant’s “delusions of misery” are briefly re-
viewed. In section 4 the implications of this analy-
sis for the idea of pain and suffering as potentially 
delusional are further assessed in light of current 
analyses of delusional experience. 
 
█  2 Imaginary and imagined pain and suffering 
 
There is sufficient semantic overlap to warrant 
accepting common usage by which the differing 
ways we feel pain are all described as states of pain 
and suffering, and the terms are used interchange-
ably in what follows. This usage is discussed fur-
ther (see 1.4 below), but for the present we’ll fol-
low the example of depression researcher Helen 
Mayberg when she says of her patients’ suffering: 
 
You can’t think, but you are in pain. Now, how 
does your psyche hurt? What a weird choice of 
words. But it is not an arbitrary choice. It’s 
there. These people are feeling a particular, in-
describable kind of pain.12  
 
The different forms of pain experience are al-
lied, it is argued here, in relation to the matter of 
their imaginability. If there is a respect in which 
we cannot imagine our own pain and suffering, it 
may serve to confirm Mayberg’s assertion, and 
clarify the relationship between seemingly differ-
ent kinds of pain. 
When it is proprietary, rather than another 
person’s, the feeling of pain or suffering in what 
follows is designated “P”. Explored here is: “X 
imagines P” – the direct referential acquaintance 
with P, provided by what has been described as 
“internal ostension”,13 and also sometimes known 
as “direct perception imagining”.14 By contrast 
with it, “X imagines that P is Ø” – a proposition 
about P, exhibits an apprehension associated with 
inferential knowledge by description. 
Imagining is perspectival. If we adopt a specta-
tor’s perspective, proprietary feelings of pain can 
readily be summoned. In that imagining (i), I cre-
ate an image of myself wracked and contorted 
through injury or disease, or frozen with depres-
sive despair. In addition to the perspective from 
which the imagining is undertaken, the place of 
the subject in imagining, and the contrast between 
propositional and non-propositional imagining, 
have also been noted.15 (i) above (imagining P 
from the perspective of a spectator), is achieva-
ble.16 In doubt is that we can (ii) imagine P from 
the inside, by way of the direct referential ac-
quaintance. (i) and (ii), each differ from (iii) imag-
ining P propositionally: “imagining that” there is a 
state of P or that P is present, expressing the infer-
ence derived from the experience, or that the pain 
and suffering has particular properties, such as in-
tensity or location.  
 
█  2.1 Imagining (P) simpliciter, an imagining form 
fruste? 
 
The imagining sought here will be achieved on-
ly if we imagine P from the inside, we imagine our-
selves feeling P, rather than as spectators envision-
ing ourselves feeling P, and we imagine P non-
propositionally (rather than imagining that we feel 
P – even though the inference [that we feel P] 
would naturally ensue from the feeling). Succeed-
ing in imagining P in ways not captured by (i) or 
(iii) or some combination of them will be referred 
in what follows as imagining (P) simpliciter. Each 
of these features fit the “flashback” memories expe-
rienced after trauma, which are understood to be the 
painful re-living of past hurtful, alarming and painful 
experiences.17 At least when identified clinically as 
diagnostic symptoms of trauma disorders, these are 
not imaginings, however. They are unsought and 
uncontrollable re-experiencings or re-livings of 
which the subject is the passive (and invariably un-
comfortable) victim.18 
The contention about imagining explored here 
has several parts: imagining P simpliciter involves 
a distinct alternative that cannot be conflated with 
other forms of imagining; and from our ability to 
imagine P in the ways described in (i) and (iii), it 
cannot be inferred that imagining P simpliciter is 
even possible. The conclusion drawn is that at 
least this one imaginative mode (imagining (P) 
simpliciter), cannot be achieved. This impossible 
exercise at imagining will be here distinguished as 
a forme fruste of imagining. In medicine, formes 
fruste are forms that are incomplete, although at 
first sight apparently possible, conditions. 
Employing empirical research methods, a re-
cent set of studies was used to challenge the hy-
pothesis that pains associated with tissue damage, 
being private and subjective, could not be halluci-
nated. With research subjects offered the oppor-




scribe scenarios presented to them in a laboratory 
setting, it was concluded that lay people tend to 
hold that «pain hallucinations are possible».19 
Aspects of the research design and method, the 
mixed findings;20 and the choice of research sub-
jects are all grounds for seeking an alternative to 
this approach. Designed to illustrate that imagining 
P simpliciter is a forme fruste of imagining, the fol-
lowing examples provide attempts to imagine with-
out re-experiencing pain and suffering. The lack of 
success of our efforts to engage in this kind of men-
tal activity, it is concluded, suggest that it cannot be 
done. As imagining P simpliciter, “imagining” pain 
and suffering is a form fruste of imagining.  
 
█  2.2 Flying knives and terrible news 
 
Imagine what must be a painful experience - 
catching a flying knife.21 Our minds seize on this 
visual image, complete with flash of metal moving 
through the air, a sense of bodily lurching forward, 
the facial feel of (actual) wince and grimace as the 
imagined knife makes contact, the image of its sear-
ing our outstretched hand, and the line of blood. All 
of these combine in an unbearable, even painful 
apprehension. Do we also imagine the feeling of the 
pain itself? It seems not. An irreducible element of 
pain experience, a sort of simulacra of the felt pain 
itself, is absent from this otherwise vivid, complex, 
and unpleasant imagining. Short of feeling the pain, 
it seems, we try in vain to imagine feeling it. 
At least by those capable of visual imagery (a 
majority), the flying knife example demonstrates 
how readily some perceptual experience admits of 
being imagined. The visual image of the flying 
knife is so real it might prompt spontaneous re-
sponses: we grimace and shudder, apprehending 
it, just as we might flinch or gasp watching vio-
lence at the movies. It can even be said that the 
unpleasant, even abhorrent experience of imagin-
ing this scenario is likely to be painful. To imagine 
something with feeling, is not the same as to imag-
ine having that feeling, as Moran has pointed 
out.22 The experience may be painful, yet it is not 
an experience of pain. It doesn’t hurt. If it were to 
hurt, it is re-experienced, not (merely) imagined. 
For a parallel case with more emotional pain 
and suffering, imagine learning a piece of terrible 
news: the unexpected death of a beloved friend, 
for example. You envision yourself crumple with 
distress, your throat may even constrict at the 
thought, you see yourself try to move, reach for a 
phone, gasp in unbelief. All this, you can imagine. 
But the feeling of pain, separated from elements 
accompanying, causing and forming a sequel to it, 
does not seem to be part of the content of your im-
agining. The exercise of imagining may make you 
feel terrible, but as a consequence or accompani-
ment of your imagining. And, corresponding to 
the flying knife example, feeling the pain itself, the 
feeling of pain and distress will apparently be lack-
ing, for all the indelible intensity of the image you 
entertain. If it is present, you are re-living, and not 
merely imagining the feeling experienced on re-
ceiving the news. 
When we think about both cases, something is 
absent, and the experience is – thankfully, we 
might suppose – incomplete. The separation be-
tween imagining the feeling and wholly re-
experiencing it is not bridged by a third element, 
present in imagining from the perspective of an 
observer. Missing is the apprehension of some-
thing, a simulacra, sharing phenomenal features 
with, yet distinct from, the experience itself. In-
stead, we have a binary: it is felt or not. 
Absent with these forme frustes cases of imagin-
ing, the simulacra is most evident with visual or 
auditory imagining. Imagining a sound or color 
includes a qualitative component, itself possessing 
pitch, or color. In attempting to imagine without 
re-living painful experiences such as these we seem 
without any equivalent of the experience of quali-
ties such as color when imagining sights, or pitch, 
when imagining sounds. If the painful feeling is 
necessarily absent the imaginative exercise is 
without qualitative simulacra. 
In a related discussion of imagining sense expe-
riences, Paul Noordhof recognizes the absence of 
the simulacra, while pointing out that sensuous 
imaginings usually possess not one but two ele-
ments determinative of their imaginative content: 
the content they share with veridical perceptual 
experiences and something more: a suppositional 
element that «characterizes the imaginative pro-
ject which the image serves». In the special case of 
imagining pains (or other bodily feelings such as 
itches), however, the first element is not present. 
Unlike imagining other sensory experiences such 
as seeing, imagining pains (and itches) does not 
involve «presentations of sensory qualities».23 We 
return to this analysis in 2.3. 
Our failed attempts to imagine P simpliciter 
stand in contrast to imagining others’ pain as well 
as to imagining from an observer’s perspective. In 
describing the different process by which we imag-
ine what happens in other minds, Goldman speaks 
of the creation of “pretend states”. Involved in the 
process of “supposition imagination”, these pre-
tendings are intended to correspond to the others’ 
mental states.24 The effort, it is explained, enables 
one to «create or try to create in one’s own mind a 
selected mental state, or at least a rough facsimile of 
such a state».25 The other person’s state thus 
sought illustrates, to the extent it succeeds, the ele-
ment missing in the pain and suffering cases involv-
ing attempting to imagine P simpliciter. We may try 
to create the facsimile in one’s own mind while 
avoiding re-experiencing, but it cannot be done. 
There is much about feeling pain, our own and 
others,’ that can be imagined, as Goldman’s work 
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illustrates, and our examples may be of limited in-
terest ethically. Imagining not from the inside but 
from the outside provides us with vital interper-
sonal knowledge, it has been explained, and 
grounds empathic responses to others.26 But the 
kind of reproductive or recreative imagining de-
picted by Goldman differs fundamentally from 
that attempted in imagining P simpliciter. The 
ability to imagine is a variable trait, absent or rela-
tively impoverished in some people even for outer 
sense, including visual and auditory, imaginings. If 
persuasive, the above examples illuminate an addi-
tional feature common to different kinds of pain 
experience. But it must be acknowledged that in-
tuitive responses to examples cannot perhaps fully 
establish a defensible claim about imaginability. 
 
█  2.3 Why is imagining P simpliciter a forme fruste 
of imagining? 
 
In addition to the features sketched in (i)-(iii) 
above, imagining has been distinguished in further 
ways, including imagining X from imagining do-
ing X,27 and imagining when the imaginer is part 
of the imagined content.28 Pain and suffering are 
affections, things we ourselves undergo or endure, 
however. Although we are active in our attempts 
to imagine P simpliciter, failure of which is illus-
trated in our examples, those efforts will necessari-
ly include the imaginer as part of the content.29 
More pertinent for our inquiry, propositional 
imagining has been separated from the non-
propositional imagining variously known as imag-
istic, perceptual or sensory.30 If I imagine that the 
moon is thousands of miles away, I imagine prop-
ositionally. If I imagine a house with six chimneys I 
may – it seems I need not – engage my non-
propositional imagination. One way to imagistically 
(perceptually, sensorially) imagine is to create or be 
subject to “images” from one of the other sense 
modalities: most obviously, we imagine seeing X, or 
imagine X, when we see it in our mind’s eye; imag-
ine hearing Y, when we hear it internally. Its ety-
mology suggests that this sort of imagistic (percep-
tual, sensorial) imagining has primacy.  
The Empiricist supposition was that all imagin-
ing involves – or even reduces to – images.31 But 
more commonly held today are mixed models, 
where imagining may be both with and without 
perceptual or imagistic elements, and “image” is 
comparably loosened to allow it.32 That all imagin-
ing reduces to imagistic imagining has been taken 
as belied by the way several distinct imaginings 
can be captured intentionally using a single image 
token (the imagined figure is first my mother and, 
phenomenally unchanged, my aunt).33 Recent 
avoidance of a strictly imagistic conception of im-
agining can be attributed to this argument separat-
ing imaginings through intentionality, as well as to 
the presence of intuitive counterexamples, where 
we seem to imagine without images (such as imag-
ining the moon being thousands of miles away). 
If our examples suggest that imagining P sim-
pliciter affords us no image, what might this re-
flect? Some painful feelings present themselves as 
less complex than the images we associate with 
visual scenes or auditory sequences. Arguably, 
they better correspond to the perceptual qualities 
(colors, sounds, shapes, etc.) that make up part of 
such visual and auditory imaginings. But allowing 
that (some) pain and suffering correspond to sounds 
or colors, will not alone capture the way we imagine 
apprehending simple colors in our mind’s eye or au-
ditory tones in its ear, however. At least typically, 
pain hurts and is also unwelcome. And neurological-
ly, even the simplest pain involves functionally spe-
cialized networks, with affective (emotional-
cognitive) as well as sensory-discriminative com-
ponents. Moreover, deprived of its affective ele-
ments, as occurs in certain dissociation syndromes, 
pain has been found to lose all its informational and 
motivational force, «with regard to the location, 
intensity, temporal profile and nature of harmful 
stimuli».34 While some pain and suffering may be 
experienced as elementally simple, the affective as-
pects of felt bodily pain and the somatic accompa-
niments interwoven with emotional suffering, sug-
gest that whatever its phenomenology, these expe-
riences are more complicated than the experience 
of colors and auditory tones. 
Exploring the contrast between imagistic (per-
ceptual, sensory) imaging and propositional imag-
ining, Bayne and Pacherie extend perceptual imag-
inings beyond the case of envisioning in one’s 
mind’s eye to cases of “quasi motor imagining”.35 
Examples of quasi-motor imagining involve ac-
tion, however. They are not, like feelings, states of 
which their subjects are passive recipients. They 
will thus be unhelpful to the analysis of feelings 
that resist imagining P simpliciter.  
 
█  2.4 Possible analyses 
 
Some partial explanation of why imagining P 
simpliciter seems to be a forme fruste of imagining, 
can be found in other discussions of imagining, one 
concerning structural differences among sense mo-
dalities; a second emphasizing the “raw feel” ele-
ment of pain and a third introducing features of 
basic emotions. A final analysis rejecting the struc-
tural model by which imagining is to be understood 
is beyond the scope of the present paper.36 
First, it has been argued that optical and audi-
tory senses alone possess a triadic structure fram-
ing, and responsible for, their distinctive phenom-
enology. Comprising (i) the mind’s inner eye or 
ear, (ii) the internal field, and (iii) the visible or 
audible object located within it, this structure is 
absent, or at least different, with the senses of 




variations she finds within the sense modalities, 
Brann concludes that strictly speaking, taste, smell 
and touch are imageless, or “not imagistic”.37 Con-
trary to that position, dimly recognized body maps 
may be supposed to allow a comparable internal 
field and triadic structure for the other senses and 
for the internal sensory (or “proprio-sensorial”)38 
modes including those involving apprehension of 
pain and suffering. Such body maps (derived from 
non-conscious body schemas as well as from the 
body images of which we are or can become 
aware), that provide the ongoing information al-
lowing us to proceed on our spatiotemporal path 
through the material world, and might suggest re-
visions to this aspect of Brann’s analysis. Imagined 
sights and sounds may only be distinguished by a 
triadic structure that is relatively more evident and 
precise due to the confirmation by other perceiv-
ers in the shared observable world of outer sense 
perception. The painfully injured toe that forms 
one part of this triadic structure is publicly verifi-
able. The intervening distances are (sometimes) 
public, not merely private, phenomena. 
Second, Brann draws a stronger conclusion, 
however. Rather than delivering «the apprehen-
sion of distinct objects confronting the subject 
over intervening distances», even the other senses 
of touch, smell and taste merely deliver «immedi-
ate qualities or feels».39 As well as used to explain 
the distinctive epistemology attributed to pain ex-
periences, their status as immediate qualities or 
raw feels, would also account for why feelings of 
pain could not be imagined simpliciter.40 The pain 
that typically emanates from tissue damage has 
often been judged to involve irreducibly subjective 
experiences associated with a limited range of 
phenomenal properties. There is something it is 
like to feel pain, but pains are private, subjective 
states, not amenable to the distinction between 
what is and what appears. Without correctness 
conditions, the pain is merely felt or not. An influ-
ential effort to counter mind-brain identity theory 
invokes imaginary pain to argue that merely imag-
ining a pain sensation through its phenomenal 
properties, unaccompanied by any corresponding 
brain state, will be impossible because pain is no 
more than those properties.41 Accounts of why at 
least some feelings lack intentionality point to a 
closely related feature. Not over or about any-
thing, phenomenal “raw feels” have been de-
scribed as intransitive, such that they are «simply 
present or absent».42 If these feelings are either 
experienced or not, it seems to follow, then when 
we try to imagine them (imagining P simpliciter) 
we must fail. 
Third, in their work directed towards how our 
human language referring to internal perception 
(or “proprioception”) of feelings and other states 
is acquired and achieved, Dellantonio and Pastore 
hypothesize that the respective emphasis on cog-
nitive elements and the sensory elements they call 
“phenomenological tone,” will vary according to 
the feelings in question. Along with fear, anger, 
and disgust, in the handful of universally-
occurring “basic emotions” identified by theorists, 
is sometimes included the distressing “sadness” 
that resembles depressive pain and suffering. Over 
such basic emotions, it is explained, cognitive, 
propositionally-understood elements will play a 
reduced role in acquiring and achieving language 
capabilities, while sensory (phenomenological 
tone) elements, will be relatively important, even 
sufficient, for identifying such feelings. In con-
trast, linguistic competence over non-basic emo-
tions (regret or nostalgia, for example) will rest on 
recognition of the conditions that typically cause 
and situations that accompany them, learned in-
ferentially. Thus, while apprehension of the phe-
nomenal tone is sufficient for identifying basic 
emotions such as (at least some) sadness, the 
greater the complexity of non-basic emotions, the 
more their identification and classification rest on 
propositional and inferential knowledge.43 Under-
stood to be a basic emotion, the pain and suffering 
described as extreme sadness can be expected to 
correspond to more apparently somatic pain in 
this respect. 
Understood as pain and suffering, much sad-
ness involves more complex, intentional feelings 
and cognitive elements, allowing us to imagine it – 
as spectators – in rich and complex detail likely 
exceeding that in the pain associated with tissue 
damage. Yet if not only the pain typically associat-
ed with tissue damage, but also those other feel-
ings of pain and suffering share alike this feature 
of being identified, at least primarily, through 
their more somatic components, then we can ap-
parently explain why our examples seem to show 
the same imagining fruste. Phenomenal elements 
of each kind will be experienced or not, in the 
manner of raw feels – explaining why, trying to 
imagine them (P simpliciter imagining), without 
re-experiencing them, we fail. 
Feeling theories, as we saw earlier, divide be-
tween those emphasizing the cognitive element 
associated with feelings and those, following 
James and Lange’s analyses of emotion, stressing 
their sensory and somatic qualities. By bifurcating 
the class of emotions, Dellantonio and Pastore’s 
work illustrates, it is possible to recognize a way 
towards reconciling these two models that may 
further explain why, when P is pain and suffering, 
imagining P simpliciter will not succeed. 
 
█  2.5 Different feelings of pain and suffering com-
pared 
 
Used naturally, “feelings” include both the 
states typically caused by tissue damage and expe-
rienced as painful, and the distress associated with 
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states identified as emotions. The category of feel-
ings is even broader, including what are commonly 
separated as emotional states (both moods and 
more enduring attitudes), localized pain sensa-
tions, and tactile sensations, as well as whole bodi-
ly experiences.44 Terms such as “pain” and “suffer-
ing” are better seen as broad concepts sharing over-
lapping (family) resemblances, since the pain asso-
ciated with tissue damage is distinct from the acti-
vation of physiological pain centers or nociceptive 
pathways that bring it to conscious awareness, and 
are extensively influenced by higher-order cognitive 
states of expectation and belief with respect to both 
stimulus intensity and subjective unpleasantness.45 
That pain and suffering may possess the same 
sort of irreducibly phenomenal properties as expe-
riencing localized bodily pain from tissue damage 
apparently authorizes us to extend the analysis 
above to the pain and suffering of the depression 
sufferer, the example of terrible news was used to 
suggest. Support for this position comes from a 
range of sources.  
(i) There is phenomenological report. For ex-
ample: «There is something it is like to feel sad, 
both psychically and physically – perhaps for some 
it is a kind of feeling of vulnerability and melan-
choly weariness accompanied by bodily fatigue».46 
And the phenomenology of such feelings has been 
recognized to sometimes include indissoluble mix-
tures of more and less somatically-experienced 
states.47 Similarly, while somehow localized, feelings 
are described as distinct from a given bodily organ 
or area: «not the felt body, but the feeling body – 
the resonant field through which we are affectively 
aware of something else [that] discloses the signifi-
cance of something and thereby functions as the 
prime channel of affective experience».48  
(ii) Clinical data indicates that somatically-
experienced pain regularly accompanies the feel-
ings and mood states making up diagnosed de-
pression.49 
(iii) Recent analyses of internal perception em-
phasize the range of ongoing somatic information 
that accompanies emotional feelings while being 
confined “recessively” to the margins of conscious 
awareness or attention.50  
(iv) From neuroscience evidence emerges of 
overlap and intermingling between more and less 
somatically-experienced pain in the brain struc-
tures that accompany them.51 (Because such affec-
tive elements influence pain from tissue damage at 
every level, pain scientists have increasingly 
moved toward seeing such pains as ineluctably af-
fective, and thus as emotions, even as many phi-
losophers have increasingly analogized them, and 
such localized bodily feelings, to perceptual expe-
rience. More sensorially-experienced pains, at 
least, are then construed as representations of par-
ticular, damaged bodily states in the same way 
that perceptions are seen to represent the non-
bodily world around us).52  
(v) Cultural historians have shown that rather 
than the brute, unchanging aspects of human ex-
perience that they often seem to us, pain and suf-
fering are best seen as constructions, mediated by 
cultural ideas and expectations.53 
The commonalities between more and less so-
matically-experienced pain are striking. Stimulus 
intensity and unpleasantness are characteristic of 
the range of experiences described as pain and suf-
fering; important forms of behavioral expression 
are common to both (gasps, cries, grimaces, and 
tears); synonyms are shared: “anguish,” “suffer-
ing,” and “hurt” for example, in addition to every 
cognate of “pain”). The relationship between more 
and less somatically and sensorially experienced 
pain feelings has been contested since William 
James’s famous discussion. When we speak of expe-
riencing “emotional” pain, some suggest, we employ 
metaphor only: a painful depression is closer to a 
painful decision, or encounter, on this view, than to 
my splitting headache or twinge of back pain.54 Oth-
er discussions separate what can loosely be called 
somatic pain and emotional pain as parallel, but dis-
tinct, senses of “pain” (and “suffering”), or else allow 
that the term is broad enough and the commonali-
ties sufficiently numerous to accommodate each of 
these several core cases of pain – the heartache of 
despair, as much as the chest pain of angina.55 
In support of the view that all are core cases of 
pain is that more and less localized and somatic or 
sensorial pains each reflect hybrid classes. “Emo-
tional” pain may seem distinct, but “emotions” 
range from intense anger and rage to calm pas-
sions such as nostalgia, and enduring attitudinal 
states, such as envy; what may be true for some, 
may not for other emotions. Paralleling this range, 
moreover, “pain” similarly lacks a unitary charac-
terization, it has been pointed out. No qualitative 
content, even including “painful feelings,” is con-
sistently present in cases persuasively described, 
by observers and sufferers alike, as pain.56 
 
█  2.6 Can’t or Won’t: Feelings of pain and imagina-
tive resistance 
 
Our seeming inability to imagine some things 
has been explored by Gendler. Her work on imag-
inative resistance, emphasizes that in some cases it 
seems we can’t, while in others we don’t want to, 
imagine – not wanting, as she puts it, to take on 
points of view we would not reflectively endorse as 
authentically our own.57 Gendler’s taxonomy actu-
ally separates four cases: pure won’t cases that 
evoke feelings of imaginative impropriety without 
imaginative barriers; pure can’t cases that evoke 
imaginative barriers without feelings of imagina-
tive impropriety; wont – couldn’t cases, that evoke 
both feelings of imaginative impropriety and im-




impropriety eclipses the imaginative barrier; and 
can’t – wouldn’t cases, which are the contrary, 
where it is the imaginative barrier that explains 
our failure to explain the world, eclipsing the mo-
tivating force of the imaginative impropriety.58  
If the position developed thus far is viable, 
then imaginative resistence over feelings of pain 
and suffering are can’t cases, they exhibit an imag-
inative barrier. Conceptual features of those feel-
ings render them unimaginable in this one particu-
lar way, even though much about and over them 
can be imagined. The question of whether there is 
also imaginative impropriety, thus making our in-
ability to imagine feelings of misery an instance of 
can’t-wouldn’t, is not so easy to resolve.59 Attitudes 
towards suffering are too complex to be easily fit-
ted into Gendler’s rubric.  
 
█  3 Kant’s melancholic’s “mere delusions of 
misery” 
 
Brief remarks in the Anthropologie indicate that 
Kant understands melancholia as delusional mis-
ery, pain, or suffering.60 Just as the hypochondriac 
suffers imaginary illnesses, Kant asserts, the mel-
ancholic may suffer «a mere delusion of mis-
ery».61 Of this delusion, he adds that «the low-
spirited self-tormenter (inclined towards feeling 
wretched) creates for himself».62 “Wahnsinn” in 
these passages from the Anthropologie might 
equally and perhaps more closely be rendered 
something like “deluded meaning,” rather than 
“delusion.” Yet neither “delusion” nor “melancho-
lia” was as sharply defined in Kant’s time as to 
prevent our employing the more natural, and also 
loose, English “delusion” and “deluded”.63 
Kant was an astute observer of mental disorder; 
moreover, the conditions he describes here (hypo-
chondria and melancholia) are reflected in today’s 
nosology and symptom descriptions. Despite the 
risk of confusion in changes of usage between 
Kant’s time and ours, “delusion” and “deluded” or 
“delusional” remain imprecise enough to warrant 
their inclusion in the analysis undertaken here.64 
Kant’s passage above seems to admit of two in-
terpretations. One is that some at least of the mel-
ancholic’s feelings (of misery), like the imaginary 
illness of the hypochondriac, are not actually felt, 
or imaginary. Alternatively, and although a causal 
outcome of nothing more than the person’s imag-
ination combined with an inclination towards feel-
ing wretched, the person experiencing feelings of 
misery really feels wretched. The analogy between 
hypochondria and melancholia lies at the center of 
the ambiguity. And Kant’s further comments fail 
to resolve it. The downstream causal products of 
no more than imagination can still be either felt, or 
merely imaginary, and not felt. The placebo pro-
duces real effects, by way of real, if only incom-
pletely recognized, expectations. Similarly, de-
scriptions of psychogenic and phantom limb pain 
are careful to note that the pain is really felt, even 
if its origins cannot be linked to tissue damage.65 
Kant’s remarks on how to go about treating de-
fects of reason further explain his reasoning in the 
above passage.66 Speaking of ways to remedy hy-
pochondria, rather than melancholia, Kant extolls 
the power of the mind to heal itself, remarking 
that a reasonable person can prevent the tendency 
toward hypochondria from becoming a more seri-
ous illness by distracting himself, redirecting his 
attention and engaging in a close analysis of his 
misapprehensions.67  
 
[…] averting attention from certain painful 
sensations, and concentrating on some other 
object voluntarily grasped in thought, can ward 
off the painful sensations so completely that 
they are unable to break out into an illness.68  
 
Using distraction this way, he asserts, has 
worked with his personal efforts to counter the 
tendency towards hypochondria. Because melan-
cholia is allied to hypochondria in Kant’s discus-
sion, these passages suggest that he supposed feel-
ings of misery, too, might be extinguished, aug-
mented, or otherwise changed by controlling at-
tention.  
 
█  4 Feelings of pain, suffering and misery as 
delusions 
 
Certain traits have long been proposed as char-
acteristic, if not definitive, of clinical delusions, sev-
eral relying on the doxastic assumption that delu-
sions are beliefs, or belief-like. These characteristics 
of delusions are four: 
 
(i) Delusions are false or implausible beliefs; 
  
(ii) they seem often to have been acquired in ir-
regular ways – through an inferential process 
that eludes the surrounding epistemic commu-
nity, for example; 
 
(iii) they are accepted and clung to with unwar-
ranted insistence in the face of seemingly irrefu-
table countervailing evidence; 
  
(iv) they fail to cohere with the rest of the per-
son’s beliefs, other mental states, or expressive 
and other behavioral responses.69 
 
The kinds of rationality constraints tied to belief 
ascription have been divided into three.70 Epistemic 
rationality governs the way beliefs are acquired and 
maintained in relation to evidence, thus applying to 
the deficiencies captured in (ii)-(iii) above; proce-
dural and agential rationality concern the con-
sistency and integration within the individual’s be-
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lief set, and beliefs and behavior, respectively, thus 
corresponding to the irrationalities noted in (iv).71 
 
█  4.1 Epistemic rationality 
 
If we accept these traditional characterizations 
of delusion, can feelings such as those of pain and 
suffering be delusional? Only (iv), we’ll see, is fully 
applicable to depressive pain. The question raised 
by the present discussion challenges, rather than 
accepting, the assumption about epistemic rational-
ity embodied in (i) (that delusions are false beliefs). 
Mistakes or infelicities involving their belief ele-
ments are part of (many) affective states.72 The per-
son may be mistaken over why he feels pain and 
suffering, what he is suffering over or about, even 
over how relatively miserable he is, in addition to 
what he might do about it. The feeling’s object may 
be obscure, as in mood states without any clearly 
defined or definable object, as well as those whose 
apparent “object” is all-encompassing. In these 
and other ways, painful feelings are often accom-
panied by judgements about oneself and one’s 
feelings that are inaccurate. Depending on con-
text, they might qualify for our broad category of 
affective delusions. 
On doxastic accounts of delusion, they comprise 
erroneous and mistaken belief states.73 This takes 
us to what sometimes appears to be delusional 
thinking associated with depression. Delusional 
thought is somehow mediated by mysterious imag-
inative processes, as when the person comes to be-
lieve that her suffering was wrought by Martians. 
However, the imagination may enter in different 
ways, as we saw earlier. We can imagine some 
things directly, as when we imagine ourselves tak-
ing actions, or imagine others experiencing pain. 
And we come to imagine certain states of affairs in-
directly, through the mediation of expectations. 
The delusional thought that her pain is brought 
about by Martians will have been brought about by 
efforts of the imagination. But her feeling pain can-
not be because she inaccurately believes she feels 
pain. If she experiences pain and suffering, brought 
about by imagination indirectly. then at least on a 
doxastic or belief-based account of delusions her 
belief that she is in pain may be accurate – appar-
ently failing to explain why she should be seen as 
delusional. And on a non-doxastic, meta-cognitive 
account, we’ll see, feelings of pain and suffering (or 
misery) fare little better as instances of delusion. 
While they are accompanied by, or comprise 
erroneous belief elements when regarded as affec-
tive wholes, feelings of pain do not reduce to those 
elements, as even the most committed cognitivist 
and appraisal theorists admit.74 Part 1 of this dis-
cussion attempted to show that there remains a 
phenomenal residue, a way it is to feel in feeling 
pain and suffering which resists characterization 
in terms beyond itself at the same time as it also 
resists reduction to the cognitive elements with 
which it is associated. Feelings are often quixotic 
and random; they affect us in ways we can neither 
understand nor control. And (ii) above (acquired 
in irregular ways), since it captures much of what 
has traditionally been regarded as distinguishing 
affective states, is not a characteristic applicable to 
whether there can be delusional feelings. Similarly, 
and related, our feelings are often tenaciously 
maintained, even in the face of counter-evidence 
(see (iii)). We do not expect them to be entirely 
constrained by what might be supposed to sup-
port, explain, or warrant, them.75  
 
█  4.2 Procedural rationality 
 
By contrast with these other characteristics of 
delusional responses, the incoherence captured in 
(iv) that violates Bortolotti’s agential rationality 
does seem to get traction with the thesis that we 
may be deluded about feeling miserable. Yet, clini-
cal evidence indicates that such inconsistency is 
not commonly associated with melancholia and 
depression, which typically exhibit consistency such 
as to account for systematically biased cognitive 
habits. Inconsistencies between feelings and their 
outward expression in action, behavior, gesture, or 
demeanor might be expected to represent a 
stronger case here, assessed as they are by social 
norms.76 However, mood disorders such as de-
pression are commonly identified by their overall 
coherence, or congruence, rather than incongru-
ence.77 His suicidal preoccupations and self-
neglect seem appropriate to the despair and self-
loathing voiced by the depression sufferer. 78 Be-
cause incongruence is not characteristic of depres-
sive disorders, we cannot easily appeal to this fea-
ture to confirm the delusional status of our melan-
cholic’s feelings of misery. 
In sum, the usual characteristics of delusions on-
ly very imperfectly capture the feelings we are in-
terested in deemed by Kant to be delusional. Crite-
ria (i)-(iii) are inapplicable to feeling states because 
of their status as affections; those in (iv), while ap-
plicable, are not strongly associated with the melan-
cholic or the pain and suffering of depression. 
 
█  4.3 Imagination and Currie-style meta-cognitivism 
 
In the metacognitive account offered by Greg-
ory Currie and associates the deluded person ima-
gines, rather than believing, P while at the same 
time mistakenly believing that he believes P.79 The 
delusional person thus portrayed entertains a false 
belief about his own cognitive states.80 He seems 
to believe P, but actually only imagines P, while 
mistakenly believing he believes P. This apparent-
ly fits Kant’s account of some of the hypochondri-
ac’s ideas: he imagines he is ill, is not ill, but (mis-




being ill (in the sense intended), however, is usual-
ly understood to be an independently verifiable 
bodily state. 
In application to all delusions, the metacogni-
tive account has been criticized.81 Even with re-
gard to pain and suffering, it proves problematic, 
requiring that the depressed person is not misera-
ble, imagines feeling pain and suffering, and mis-
takenly believes that he believes that he is (suffer-
ing), confusing what he imagines with what he be-
lieves. Certainly, as we saw, the depressed person 
might hold mistaken beliefs over aspects of his 
state that would in turn distort affective responses 
to it. He may judge himself to deserve to die be-
cause of some imagined crime (an example not un-
common within the annals of delusional depres-
sion). He can be loosely said to imagine himself 
feeling pain – when that refers to what his feeling 
is over or about, its origins, or how intense it is in 
comparison with other painful feelings. But if the 
reasoning in the first part of this discussion is per-
suasive, one side of the metacognitive formulation 
– the person’s imagining feeling pain (without ac-
tually being in pain) – will be precluded. To suc-
cessfully imagine feeling P simpliciter can only be 
to actually feel pain. 
Other forms of imagining may be sufficient for 
some minimal meta-cognitive account, inasmuch 
as the depressed person is able to (propositionally) 
imagine that he is in pain; or imagine his feeling 
by envisioning it from the outside. The impossibil-
ity of imagining P simpliciter would seem to render 
the meta-cognitive account significantly incom-
plete. Without any imagined feelings to provide 
the prompt for additional propositional and imag-
istic imaginings, there would be less reason for 
such subsequent imaginings to arise in the first 
place. Other triggers there would be, certainly, in-
cluding the mere, and perhaps mistaken, inferred 
belief that he feels pain derived from others’ obser-
vations, or his own, imagining as a spectator. But 
feelings must be an important goad and occasion 
for many subsequent elaborations and inferences.  
As a response to, and result of, feeling pain, the 
person would conclude that he feels pain; attend to 
what he feels pain over or about; or, from an ob-
server’s perspective – and mistakenly, even delu-
sionally, or not – imagine his own suffering. Per-
haps not wholly, but still undeniably, this impedi-
ment to imagining pain and suffering will dimin-
ish the force of the meta-cognitive analysis. 
 
█  5 Conclusions 
 
If the hindrances to imagining oneself feeling 
pain identified here are persuasively argued for, 
the depressed person’s feelings of pain will not be 
entirely imaginary. And so regarded, contra Kant, 
they are not delusional, either as false beliefs, or as 
imaginings mistaken for believings. Nor does the 
imagining forme fruste identified here reflect bar-
riers involving authenticity: it will be conceptually 
impossible to imagine feelings of pain and suffer-
ing this way. Rather, what has been shown is that 
expectation and feedback effects can alter and en-
gender painful feelings such as those associated 
with depression. Although these feelings may be 
accompanied by, and the subject of, any number 
of mistaken beliefs, including some ranking as de-
lusional, the feelings themselves are not misappre-
hended. The depression sufferer believes he feels 
pain, and does. 
In relation to issues of imaginability, just as we 
cannot have delusional somatic pain, we cannot 
have other delusional feelings of pain and suffer-
ing. The broader implications of this analysis may 
be insignificant: there is much about pain and suf-
fering that does permit being misapprehended 
(and mis-imagined). But by pointing to this addi-
tional feature regarding imaginability common to 
both kinds of feelings, the preceding discussion 
aimed to dispel a lingering suspicion that reported 
pain may be a mere figment of the sufferer’s imag-
ination. 
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